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With this issue, which constitutes a follow-up to a 
Workshop organised in cooperation with the IFRI 
and held inside the Commission premises in October 
2011, BEPA inaugurates its new series of 
publications called “Berlaymont Papers”. Its 
ambition is to communicate and circulate to a wider 
public – well beyond the Brussels “beltway” – at 
least part of the reflections carried out by the Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers. 
BEPA’s work and mandate are, in fact, two-pronged. 
On the one hand, we work mainly with the President 
of the Commission and his services by providing 
them targeted policy advice and support. On the 
other, we also liaise with the outside world of experts 
and think tanks in order to collect additional 
“intelligence” while also conveying them the 
Commission’s view. It is a two-way street, in other 
words, along which BEPA acts as an interface. 
These new “Berlaymont Papers” are part and parcel 
of such a mission. They will deal with subjects that 
are both high on the EU agenda and closely 
monitored by BEPA – mostly in collaboration with 
other institutes and centres for policy analysis. They 
will be easily readable and accessible – also from our 
website (http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/publications/
index_en.htm) – without aiming to convey a more or 
less official “take” by the Commission. And they will 
be distributed – on demand – to all those who may 
be interested in receiving them, as are also our 
Monthly Briefs. 
We look forward to your feedback. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Le BEPA inaugure une nouvelle série de publications 
intitulées les « Berlaymont Papers » : la première 
d’entre elles, de par son thème, s’inscrit dans le 
prolongement d’un atelier de travail organisé en 
octobre 2011 dans les locaux de la Commission, en 
coopération avec l’IFRI. L’ambition de ces 
publications est de cibler un public bien plus large 
que le seul « microcosme » bruxellois et de partager 
avec lui une partie au moins des réflexions menées 
par le Bureau des Conseillers de Politique 
Européenne. 
Le rôle du BEPA recouvre, de fait, deux aspects 
distincts. D’une part, il travaille à titre principal aux 
côtés du Président de la Commission et de ses 
services en leur fournissant un appui et des conseils 
politiques ciblés. D’autre part, il établit des liens avec 
le monde des experts indépendants et des think 
tanks, en vue de trouver auprès d’eux des capacités 
d’analyse complémentaires, mais aussi de leur faire 
part des vues de la Commission sur un sujet donné. 
Dans le cadre de ce processus d’échange, le BEPA 
joue en quelque sorte le rôle d’interface. 
Les « Berlaymont Papers » font partie intégrante de 
cette mission. Ils traiteront de sujets qui tout à la fois 
figurent parmi les priorités de l’agenda de l’Union 
européenne et sont suivis de près par le BEPA – le 
plus souvent en collaboration avec d’autres instituts 
et centres d’analyse politique. Ils seront d’une lecture 
et d’un accès aisés – y compris par le biais de notre 
site Web : http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/publications/
index_fr.htm – et ne prétendront pas refléter la 
position officielle de la Commission. Ils seront 
diffusés à tous ceux qui en feront la demande, selon 
le même schéma que celui retenu pour les « Monthly 
Briefs ».  
Dans l’attente de vos réactions, 
 
Jean-Claude THEBAULT 
Directeur Général, BEPA 
Foreword Préface 
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T he new political realities in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have required the EU to take a fresh look at the Union’s relationship 
with its Southern neighbours. In response, the 
recently reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) has put cooperation with civil society 
organisations (CSOs) at the heart of the EU 
approach to the region. It aims at giving a greater 
political role to non-state actors; helping CSOs 
develop their advocacy capacity and ability to 
monitor reform; reinforcing human rights dialogue; 
and fostering media freedom. 
Objectives 
In line with the ENP approach to build partnerships 
with societies in the neighbourhood and following on 
President Barroso’s visits to Tunisia and Egypt in April 
and July 2011 respectively, BEPA in cooperation with 
the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) 
organised a high level seminar on “Transitions in the 
Southern Mediterranean: Engaging with civil 
society” (see programme on p. 20). The event took 
place on 3rd October in Brussels. 
The purpose of the seminar was to engage with civil 
society actors from the Southern Mediterranean and 
to discuss with them – as well as with experts on the 
region and EU officials – the role that civil society 
can play and the EU’s contribution to the transition 
process. 
The event brought together 55 participants, including 
civil society actors from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; 
senior EU officials from the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European External Action Service (including its 
EU delegations); and European think tankers. 
Discussions 
An open discussion on the recent and ongoing 
events in the Southern Mediterranean took place 
around three general/horizontal themes: transitions; 
societies; and EU contribution. More specifically, 
participants debated on the complexities of 
transitions and particularly those in the MENA 
region; analysed the role of civil society actors in the 
transition process, including discussing potential 
actors, the timing and methodology of intervention; 
and analysed how the Union can positively 
contribute to this process. 
EU officials admitted that the West (including the 
EU and its Member States) had not fully understood 
the dynamics in the region. “We must listen and 
understand before acting”, pointed out Bernardino 
Leon, the EUSR on the Southern Mediterranean, 
who opened the seminar. For his part, European 
Commissioner Štefan Füle emphasised that the ENP 
is more than instruments; it is a dynamic framework 
within which the dialogue with our partners, 
including civil society, is ongoing and will continue. 
EU officials therefore sent a clear message of their 
commitment to the Southern Mediterranean region 
and to transition towards democracy. 
In addition, representatives of the EU institutions 
recognised that we face a very heterogeneous region 
in terms of the role of the army, republican 
traditions, types of monarchies, and the impact of 
regional actors (e.g. Qatar, Turkey, and the Arab 
League). As participants from the region noted, 
there is no “Arab world”; rather we must accept the 
diversities of this region and speak of “Arab worlds”. 
The revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco 
(countries of origin of seminar participants) are all 
distinct. Accordingly, the ENP approach for 
increased differentiation allowing each partner 
country to develop its links with the EU as far as its 
own aspirations, needs and capacities is arguably the 
best way for addressing challenges in the region. 
Despite the fact that transition countries are at 
different stages of development, there are some 
common challenges to face: ensuring that state 
structures are functional (need for reforms at 
constitutional and rule of law levels – especially 
police and justice – and security sector reform); 
rebuilding the education systems; reinforcing the 
health systems; pushing for transitional justice and 
national reconciliation. 
Furthermore, there was consensus among 
participants both from the EU and the Southern 
Mediterranean that civil society will have a 
tremendous role to play in the transition process 
throughout the region. Civil society actors have been 
in opposition and kept silent for so long that they 
will have to (re-)learn how to act. 
These new civil society actors are also much more 
specialised: they have created their own niches on 
such issues as prisons, press law, women rights. 
They have also become diversified during the 
transition period. This means that there are multiple 
visions of the role of secularism, Islam, women, to 
name a few. 
Engaging civil society in the Southern Mediterranean:  
Seminar Summary and Conclusions 
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The diasporas living in the EU will also have a role 
to play. Travelling will become easier in the post-
revolution period, so the diasporas will be able to 
contribute to the transfer of knowledge and to build 
bridges between Europe and the Middle East/North 
Africa region. 
Seminar Conclusions and Recommendations 
• Support national reconciliation: Provide 
closure to families of victims – from dialogue 
platforms and reinsertion of freedom fighters to 
forensic support to identify bodies of missing 
persons. Societies are scarred by civil strife and 
hard work is needed to reconcile different (ethnic 
and/or religious) groups. Immediate expertise on 
transitional justice and specialised equipment (e.g. 
DNA-collecting kits) are needed. 
• Reform of administration: The old political 
leadership may be gone, but it is business as usual 
in the administration of the countries and there is 
a general absence of confidence in political 
parties, according to the Egyptian and Tunisian 
participants. Thus, the revamped ENP must hold 
governments in the transition countries 
accountable. 
• Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: 
Immediate support to, advice for and strategic 
mentoring of the police and Ministries of Interior 
are needed. In Egypt, reform and training of the 
military is also urgent. Rapid deployment of 
police, rule of law and military experts as well as 
procurement experts is essential. 
• Reform of education systems: Concentrate on 
providing training at international standards (the 
right to an education system of quality); embed the 
principles of human rights in school curricula; go 
beyond the expansion of the Erasmus Mundus 
programme; assist the development of university 
management. Rebuilding the education system 
will help keep young people in their countries and 
therefore also help contain a potential 
immigration issue for Europe. 
• Promote gender equality in the new 
legislation: In many of the southern 
Mediterranean countries in transition, civil 
legislation discriminates against women. It is 
important that work on equality does not stop 
once legislation has been enacted: long-term work 
is needed to ensure that the laws are enforced 
without discrimination. 
• Tackle the economic crisis in the transition 
countries: There are social implications to the 
growing unemployment (especially unemployment 
of youth, under the age of 30). This will also help 
contain the potential problem of immigration to 
the EU. 
• Create a legal framework for NGOs: Very few 
NGOs were allowed to exist under the previous 
regimes. Contacts with foreign organisations were 
banned. Many were actually GONGOs, funded 
by the previous regimes and representing its 
interests rather than those of the population. 
Other organisations were/are registered abroad. 
Rapid deployment of legal experts to work on this 
issue is necessary. 
• Build civil society capacity: More than funding, 
new local non-state actors need training from EU 
experts on capacity building and 
professionalization so that they can play an 
important role in the democratisation of their 
countries. Most organisations lack basic skills and 
capacity. The international community could 
provide initial support in the creation of resource 
centres and the organisation of workshops on 
fundraising, management, public relations, 
lobbying and networking. Work with foreign 
NGOs would be welcomed, as long as it is based 
on an equal partnership and not on a top-down 
approach where foreign NGOs receive all the 
funding and tell locals what to do. 
• Promote civic education: It is important to 
educate the population about democracy, 
including campaigns on constitutional and 
electoral processes, and promote political debate 
within a framework that allows civil society voices 
to be heard. 
• Create an independent press: Despite the 
strong impact of social media on the uprisings, 
the majority of the populations do not have 
access to Facebook and Twitter. They receive 
messages and information through the 
mainstream (printed and broadcast) media outlets 
that are playing a negative role in the transition 
process. In Egypt, for example, the media is 
campaigning against foreign intervention/aid. 
Accordingly, there is a strong need for training 
journalists. 
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T he new political realities in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have required the EU to review its relations with its Southern 
neighbours. Events in the region have also given 
the opportunity to the EU to further develop its 
external action policies and to adapt its strategic 
vision to the new circumstances. In this context, 
the Union has embarked in supporting the 
transition processes in the Southern Mediterranean 
while also identifying lessons learned from the 
past, especially from its experience in the Western 
Balkans and its Enlargement policy. 
Learning from past experience 
The EU has always been active in promoting 
human rights and democracy in its neighbourhood. 
Since its inception in 2004, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has launched and 
promoted a variety of important initiatives, 
particularly on the trade and economic front, 
which have allowed the EU and its neighbours to 
develop stronger relationships in virtually all policy 
fields, from energy to education, from transport to 
research. But it has often focused too much on 
stability for its own sake, sometimes at the expense 
of other objectives. 
The 2011 events in the Southern Mediterranean 
constitute an opportunity to overcome the 
reductionist alternative between dictatorship and 
Islamism, and the resulting “security dilemma”, 
which initially led to a disproportionate insistence 
on the potentially negative consequences of the 
Arab awakenings on migration and radicalisation. 
Political developments in the region point to 
possible liabilities, whether in Libya, Tunisia or 
Egypt. These risks, however, should not obscure 
proclaimed commitment to democracy and the 
quest for freedom, as expressed by Tunisians, 
Egyptians and others in the Mediterranean region 
– an enthusiasm that the EU should encourage. 
The restoration of the Sharia in Libya and the clear 
victory of (moderate) Islamic parties in Tunisia 
and Egypt should not be a cause for concern as 
long as democratic principles are respected. For its 
part, Turkey constitutes both a point of reference 
of the potential to combine democratic institutions 
and processes with Islam, and a partner in 
supporting democratisation in the wider region. 
The new approach 
The March 2011 joint communication on 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean specifies the three main 
paths along which the EU intends to further 
deepen its relations with its Mediterranean 
partners: democratic transformation and 
institutions building; a reinforced partnership with 
the populations; and durable and inclusive 
economic development.1 
A simplified and coherent policy and programming 
framework – as described in the May 2011 
Communication on the reviewed ENP – 
constitutes the new approach to strengthening the 
partnership between the EU and the countries and 
societies of the neighbourhood.2 The EU does not 
seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for 
political reform, but it will insist that each partner 
country’s reform process reflects a clear 
commitment to the universal values that form the 
basis of its renewed approach. Furthermore, it will 
not limit itself to a process of economic 
cooperation which is not firmly rooted in 
democratic institutions and freedoms. Specifically, 
its objectives include: 
• To adapt levels of EU support to partners 
according to progress on political reforms and 
build “deep democracy”. This term refers to the 
right to vote accompanied by the respect for 
human rights; forming competing political 
parties; receiving impartial justice from 
independent judges and security from 
accountable police and army forces; and access 
to a competent and non-corrupt civil service. 
• To support inclusive economic development so 
that EU neighbours can trade, invest and grow 
in a sustainable way, reducing social and 
regional inequalities, creating jobs for their 
workers and higher standards of living for their 
people. 
• To strengthen in parallel the two regional 
dimensions of the ENP – the Eastern 
Partnership and the Southern Mediterranean – 
EU Responses to Transitions in the Southern Mediterranean 
By Isabelle Ioannides* 
* Dr. Isabelle Ioannides is an Adviser in the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA).  
1 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Joint Communication to the European Council, the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2011) 
200 final. Brussels, 8 March 2011. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf  
2 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint Communication by the High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission. COM(2011) 303. Brussels, 25 May 2011. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf  
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so that we can work out consistent regional 
initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, 
transport or migration and mobility, 
complementing and strengthening our bilateral 
cooperation. 
• To provide the necessary mechanisms and 
instruments fit to deliver these objectives. 
This new approach is based on three essential 
premises: 
increased differentiation allowing each partner 
country to develop its links with the EU as far as 
its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow. 
There will be no bulldozer “one-size-fits-all” 
model. For those Southern neighbours able and 
willing to take part, this vision includes closer 
economic integration and stronger political 
cooperation on governance reforms, security, 
conflict resolution matters, including joint 
initiatives on issues of common interest. 
“more for more”: Increased EU support to its 
neighbours is conditional on progress in building 
and consolidating democracy and respect for the 
rule of law. The more and the faster a country 
progresses in its internal reforms, the more 
support it will receive from the EU. This enhanced 
support will come in various forms, including 
increased funding for social and economic 
development; more ambitious programmes for 
comprehensive institution-building; greater market 
access; increased EIB financing in support of 
investments; and greater facilitation of mobility. 
“less for less”: The EU will downgrade relations 
with governments who fail to make the necessary 
reforms and/or are engaged in violations of 
human rights and democracy standards. Such 
policy measures include – among other – making 
use of targeted sanctions. Where the Union takes 
such measures, it will not only uphold but further 
strengthen its support to civil society. 
In May 2011, the Union put at the disposal of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries 1.24 billion euro 
in addition to the 5.7 billion already available in 
the framework the ENP. In line with the goals and 
principles mentioned above, the European 
Commission launched “SPRING” (Support for 
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth), a 
programme to support Southern partners and 
encourage democratic transformation and 
economic growth. The total value of this initiative 
is of 350 million euro for the years 2011 and 2012. 
Moreover, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
has now made available 1 billion euro for loans to 
the transition countries, supplementing the 
4 billion already there before the Arab awakening. 
For its part, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
envisages to extend its activities to the MENA and 
to annually offer up to 2.5 billion euro for public 
and private investments to support business and 
infrastructure development. EU support will be 
tailored to the needs for each transition country 
and will concentrate on the following priorities. 
Build a Partnership with Societies 
The EU recognises that civil society plays a vital 
part in promoting greater social justice and 
democracy, including the respect of minorities, the 
equality of the sexes, women’s rights, 
environmental protection and efficient 
management of resources. A key factor to reaching 
these goals is the guarantee of the freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly. Another 
challenge is to facilitate the emergence of 
democratic political parties that represent the 
broad spectrum of views and approaches present 
in society, so that they can compete for power and 
popular support. The recently reviewed ENP puts 
cooperation with civil society organisations (CSOs) 
at the heart of the EU approach. It aims at giving 
to CSOs a greater political role, by enhancing their 
capacity building; reinforcing the dialogue on the 
human rights; and supporting freedom of the 
press. Accordingly, EU objectives include: 
Establish partnerships in each neighbouring 
country and make EU support more accessible to 
CSOs through a dedicated Civil Society Facility. With a 
total budget of initially 26.4 million euro (for 2011)3, 
it will support a greater political role for non-state 
actors through a partnership with societies, helping 
CSOs develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to 
monitor reform and their role in implementing and 
evaluating EU programmes. In particular, the Union 
will encourage the exchange of best practices and 
training; promote institution building and increase 
government accountability; provide its support to 
regional and national projects to complement 
existing programmes and instruments; and promote 
an inclusive approach of reforms that includes non-
state actors in national policy dialogue and the 
implementation of bilateral programmes. 
Reinforce human rights dialogue: EU 
Delegations will seek to bring partner countries’ 
governments and civil societies together in a 
structured dialogue on key areas of cooperation. In 
this context, the Commission recently launched a 
three year programme (7 million euro) in 
3 Similar amounts are envisaged for 2012 and 2013.  
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cooperation with the Anna Lindh Foundation, 
aiming at revitalising civil societies and promoting 
dialogue in the Southern Mediterranean by funding 
projects on culture, education, science, human 
rights, sustainable development, the empowerment 
of women and the arts. Such actions will also be 
financed through the Civil Society Facility. 
Promote media freedom by supporting civil 
society organisations’ unhindered access to the 
internet, the use of electronic communications 
technologies, and independent media in print, 
radio and television. While EU support is already 
available through the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), additional 
tools may be developed to further strengthen EU 
contribution in this area. 
Support political actors striving for democratic 
change: The creation of a European Endowment for 
Democracy (EED) will provide assistance to pro-
democracy movements, unregistered NGOs or trade 
unions and other social partners that have not been 
able to benefit from EU support so far. It will be 
designed to complement the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Instrument (ENPI) and the EIDHR. 
Achieve better understanding and mutual 
enrichment between the EU and neighbouring 
countries. For this purpose, the EU has expanded 
its Erasmus Mundus programme (66 million euro) to 
create possibilities for student and academic staff 
mobility (e.g., the opportunity to study in 
universities in EU Member States) and for 
exchange of knowledge and skills.4 750 additional 
grants for students from the region (beyond the 
1200 already envisaged) will be awarded during the 
coming university year. The Commission is 
considering supplementary measures for the next 
two academic years to further reinforce student 
and academic exchanges with the Southern 
Mediterranean. The Tempus programme, which 
supports the modernisation of universities, will be 
also reinforced in 2012 and 2013, as has been the 
case with the Euromed Youth programme. 
Connect Parliaments with a view to building 
links between European and MENA societies. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly 
(the joint Assembly of the European Parliament 
and counterparts from Southern Mediterranean 
countries) and Joint Parliamentary Committees 
between the European Parliament and partner 
countries’ Parliaments constitute essential fora for 
dialogue and increased mutual understanding 
between decision-makers. 
Intensify EU political and security 
cooperation 
The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a unique 
opportunity to become a more effective actor in 
the world. Rising to the challenge requires that its 
policies and those of its Member States be more 
closely aligned than in the past, and that 
EU instruments be backed by Member State 
policies so as to deliver a common message and 
act coherently. Consequently, the EU intends to: 
Enhance EU involvement in solving protracted conflicts 
(e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Western 
Sahara conflict), which constitute a serious security 
challenge to the whole region and compromise 
EU geopolitical, economic and security interests. 
Many EU instruments utilised in the 
neighbourhood to promote economic integration 
and sectoral cooperation could also be mobilised 
to support confidence building and conflict 
resolution objectives. The EU is also ready to 
develop, together with other relevant international 
organisations and key partners, post-conflict 
reconstruction scenarios that would act as a 
further incentive in the resolution of disputes by 
illustrating the tangible benefits of peaceful 
settlements. 
Join the use of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and other EU instruments: 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
creation of a High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy and the set up of the European 
External Action Service, political and security 
cooperation between the EU and its immediate 
neighbours can be strengthened. Where the EU is 
already engaged operationally on the ground, 
further steps can aim to exploit the synergies 
between this operational presence and efforts to 
promote reforms. 
Promote joint action with ENP partners in 
international fora on key security issues. 
Support sustainable economic and social 
development 
The immediate objective in the Southern 
Mediterranean countries is the promotion of 
sustainable economic growth and job creation and 
the improvement of social protection. The ENP 
thus aims to develop a mutually beneficial 
approach where economic development in partner 
4 Nearly 30 million euro were allocated in the 2011-2012 academic year, specifically for the Southern Neighbourhood countries. It 
represents a doubling of the allocation originally foreseen for the Southern Neighbourhood. 
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countries and in the EU, well-managed legal 
migration, and capacity building on border 
management, asylum and effective law-
enforcement cooperation go hand in hand. 
Trade is a powerful instrument to stimulate 
economic growth, support economic recovery and 
stimulate sectoral cooperation that provides the 
opportunity to Mediterranean countries to advance 
economic integration with the EU internal market. 
It is essential to establish with each of the 
countries in transition mutually beneficial and 
ambitious trade arrangements matching their needs 
and their economic capacities. Examples of 
economic initiatives that could contribute to 
curbing high unemployment and tackling poverty 
in the Southern Mediterranean include: help 
organise events to promote investment; promote 
direct investment from EU SMEs and micro-
credit; build on pilot regional development 
programmes to tackle economic disparities 
between regions; launch pilot programmes to 
support agricultural and rural development; 
improve the effectiveness of macro-financial 
assistance by streamlining its decision-making 
process; and negotiate Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas with willing and able partners. In 
order to support the development of SMEs 
(particularly the segment of business that is too 
small for banks but too large for micro-finance), 
the Union in cooperation with the German bank 
Kerditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) has created 
a new assistance programme, the SANAD 
(“support” in Arabic) (budget: 20 million). 
The main and most effective vehicle for 
developing closer trade ties is the above-
mentioned Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA). They provide for the gradual 
dismantling of trade barriers and aim for 
regulatory convergence in areas that can impact on 
trade, especially sanitary and phytosanitary rules, 
animal welfare, customs and border procedures, 
competition and public procurement. Through 
progressive approximation of EU rules and 
practices, DCFTAs require a high degree of 
commitment to complex and broad-ranging 
reforms. But for the most advanced partners, these 
agreements can lead to a progressive economic 
integration with the EU internal market in key 
sectors of the Mediterranean region (e.g. 
agriculture and services). In the shorter term, 
partners not ready or willing to embark on 
DCFTA negotiations, could benefit from trade 
concessions that the EU would extend in existing 
agreements or ongoing negotiations. They would 
cover those sectors best positioned to provide an 
immediate boost to partners’ economies, including 
the asymmetry in the pace of liberalisation of each 
partner country. Greater market access for goods 
through such Agreements on Conformity Assessment 
and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAAs) will 
enable free movement of industrial products in 
specific sectors through mutual acceptance of 
conformity certificates. 
Mobility and people-to-people contacts are 
fundamental to advancing mutual understanding 
and economic development. Labour mobility is an 
area where the EU and its neighbours can 
complement each other. The EU’s workforce is 
ageing and labour shortages will develop in 
specific areas. Our neighbourhood, on the other 
hand, has well-educated, young and talented 
workers who can fill these gaps. In attracting this 
talent, the EU is conscious of the risks of “brain 
drain”, which could require additional mitigating 
support measures. 
Mobility Partnerships provide a comprehensive 
framework ensuring that the movement of persons 
between the EU and a third country is well-
managed. They provide for better access to legal 
migration channels and strengthen capacities for 
border management and handle irregular 
migration, thus facilitating a mobility that is 
mutually beneficial. These partnerships can include 
initiatives to assist partner countries establish or 
improve labour migration management, including 
recruitment, vocational and language training, 
development and recognition of skills, and return 
and reintegration of migrants. Equally, the 
Commission calls on Member States to make full 
use of the EU Visa Code, whose implementation it 
will monitor. The EU Visa Code, seeking to 
enhance the mobility of citizens between partner 
countries and the EU, should especially target 
students, researchers and businesspeople. 
In the field of asylum, the EU will contribute to 
strengthening international protection in the 
region through the implementation of the Regional 
Protection Programme – circumstances permitting – 
for Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Initiatives by 
individual ENP partners in this area will also be 
supported. Last but not least, resettlement of 
refugees in the EU must be an integral part of EU 
efforts to support neighbouring countries 
confronted with significant refugee flows. 
EU Political Action and Cooperation 
In addition to the instruments available through 
the European institutions, the Union is also active 
at a political level. Examples include the creation 
of the Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean by the 
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High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, 
which aims at fostering coherent international 
support to strengthening democracy and inclusive 
economic development in the Mediterranean 
region, and the creation of the post of EUSR for 
the Southern Mediterranean to coordinate EU efforts 
in the region.5 
In addition, the Council for Foreign Affairs of the 
Union has put political pressure on Syria by 
applying targeted sanctions aimed at those 
responsible for or associated with the violent 
repression and those who support or benefit from 
the regime (about 75 people and 20 firms). EU 
foreign ministers approved plans to stop Syria 
accessing funds from the EIB. In parallel, the 
Union closely supports the Arab League efforts 
seeking to protect civilian populations and find a 
political solution to the current situation. 
Although it was created in (and was a product of) 
the pre-spring era, the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) also has a role to play in the 
post-revolution Mediterranean societies. It 
complements bilateral relations between the EU 
and Southern partners and should encourage 
effective and result-oriented regional cooperation. 
The UfM Secretariat in Barcelona could thus 
operate as a catalyst to bring states, the EIB, IFIs 
and the private sector together around concrete 
projects of strategic importance and support job 
generation, innovation and growth throughout the 
region. Equally, the Union is also a key actor in the 
framework of G-8 where 20 billion euro were 
pledged. Moreover, the EU has launched with the 
Council of Europe a 4.8 million euro joint regional 
programme, in view of supporting democratic 
reforms, the independence and efficiency of the 
judiciary, and the promotion of good governance 
in the Southern Mediterranean. It will also target 
corruption and human trafficking and aim to 
protect human rights and democratic values by 
working with government officials, future leaders, 
youth and civil society. The programme will 
initially be launched in Morocco and Tunisia, while 
some initiatives will be implemented for three 
years throughout the region. These endeavours will 
strive for strong complementarity and coherence 
with other EU initiatives, such as the SPRING 
programme or the future EED. 
Opportunities and Challenges 
A year after the Arab awakenings, numerous 
challenges in the Southern Mediterranean persist. 
Given the long-term nature of democratic 
transitions, this is not a surprise; rather, the EU 
could turn these challenges into opportunities for 
action. 
Aware of the need for differentiation among 
Southern Mediterranean partners – in terms of 
level of development, expectations, needs and/or 
capacities –, it is vital to identify when the “right” 
moment to become involved is; how to engage with 
the transition countries; and who the interlocutors 
and key stakeholders are. Egypt is a particularly 
difficult case due to its reluctance to foreign 
involvement – whether this takes the form of 
financial assistance, policy conditionality and/or 
security support. The EU should also be cautious 
in its selection of interlocutors in the transition 
countries to avoid being accused of applying 
double standards. The challenge will be to identify 
and include in the transition process civil society 
actors (and other non-official actors) from the 
rural areas where international players do not 
necessarily have a good understanding of the 
situation. 
The international community must recognise that 
any democratisation process will be long and 
therefore its engagement in the Southern 
Mediterranean must be for the long-term. 
Substantial and consistent commitment from both 
the EU and its Member States is therefore 
required. In this context, it is important that the 
international community moves rather quickly 
from deploying humanitarian aid to offering 
development assistance.6 Aware of these 
complexities and given the current difficulties in 
the eurozone, the Union is already reflecting on 
the possible role the private sector could play in 
the EU development policy. In this context, it is 
vital to create long-term investment opportunities 
in the region and not limit international action to 
long-term financial assistance. The EU being the 
main export market and first import market for 
most of our neighbours, trade constitutes an 
enormous potential for regional economic and 
social growth. It requires, however, economic 
modernisation and support to the private sector, 
particularly to SMEs. 
5 The Task Force brings together expertise from the European External Action Service, the European Commission, the EIB, the 
EBRD and other international financial institutions to act as a focal point for assistance to countries in North Africa facing political 
transformation.  
6 The European Commission has already offered 80.50 million euro in humanitarian aid to the Southern Mediterranean region to 
manage the flow of refugees. The Member States for their part have contributed another 73 million euro.  
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The EU should also ensure that there is no overlap 
of financial instruments, but rather that the new 
instruments created in the context of the renewed 
ENP complement existing ones. In parallel, the 
Union will need to explain to its interlocutors on 
the ground how these new tools work, whom they 
are available for, and what the requirements are. 
Equally, EU engagement must be coordinated with 
other international actors active in the region (the 
United States, Turkey, the Gulf States, the Arab 
League) to avoid inefficient dispersion of meagre 
(at times of austerity) funds and ensure effective 
and coherent action. The Union should put 
pressure on important funders who have promised 
loans and other financial aid of an amount of 
38 billion dollars. In the case of Egypt, although 
ENP action plans remain the framework for wider 
cooperation, the EU also seeks to create additional 
loan opportunities through the EIB and the 
EBRD. The Union could also play an active role in 
the monitoring and disbursement of assistance to 
guarantee that it meets real needs in the 
Mediterranean region. Funds must be distributed 
equitably to recipients, to those who truly need the 
aid rather than those who have always had access 
to it. For its part, the post-2013 European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is designed to be 
simpler and more flexible as well as reinforce 
coordination between the EU and its Member 
States. 
It is important to encourage the openness and 
reinforce the difficult choices that civil societies 
and the democratic forces in the Southern 
Mediterranean countries have made. To propose 
an “open doors” immigration policy is neither 
feasible nor credible. Nevertheless, it is 
fundamental to rebuild trust with our Southern 
neighbours. It is in this spirit that the Commission 
has significantly increased the budget of the 
Erasmus Mundus programme so that more student 
exchanges can take place and more grants can be 
awarded to students and teachers in the MENA 
region. In parallel, it is necessary to control the 
migratory flux from these countries of departure 
and contain illegal immigration by signing 
readmission agreements with them. In the medium 
term, it is crucial to seriously address the question 
of (im)migration within a multilateral framework, 
between the ageing European countries (for which 
foreign workers are a solution rather than a 
problem) and the much younger neighbouring 
countries (where some hope to work in Europe). 
General view of the BEPA seminar of 3rd October 2011 on “Transitions in the Southern Mediterranean”. 
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O n a beaucoup commenté la surprise et l’égarement des pays occidentaux face aux révolutions en Tunisie et en Egypte. En 
fait, cette sorte de décalage paraît bien antérieure. Les 
raisons sont multiples : 
Au nom de leurs intérêts stratégiques et de leur 
hantise de l’islamisme radical, certains Etats 
européens ont ignoré l’influence des sociétés civiles 
dans les pays arabes. 
Certaines figures de contestation se sont trouvées 
dans un huis clos violent avec leurs gouvernements 
des pays du Sud. Ainsi le lien de confiance est 
rompu. 
En apportant aux régimes autoritaires un soutien 
politique voire matériel, l’Occident a soutenu des 
régimes dont il ne pouvait ignorer la nature 
répressive. 
La surprise et la radicalité qui ont marqué les révoltes 
dans le monde arabe ont déstabilisé les pays 
européens pour prendre les décisions qui s’imposent. 
Les nouveaux acteurs du changement ne sont pas 
forcément ceux avec qui l’Union européenne a pris 
l’habitude de négocier. Il faudrait du temps pour se 
familiariser avec les nouveaux interlocuteurs. 
Les mécanismes de l’Union européenne sont en 
décalage par rapport à l’urgence des événements. 
La notion de transition 
Un courant des sciences politiques : la 
« transitologie » mène depuis plusieurs décennies des 
études sur le processus de démocratisation dans le 
monde et les phénomènes de transition comparée.1 Il 
est utile de connaître le contenu de ces études selon 
les observations et leur éventuelle adaptabilité au 
monde arabe. La démocratisation est le moment 
critique où l’on négocie des pactes. Il existe donc 
trois étapes pour parvenir à une transition 
démocratique :  
• la libéralisation politique ; 
• la démocratisation ; 
• la consolidation de la démocratie. 
Mais, toujours selon ce courant de la science 
politique, le monde arabe est divisé en deux camps : 
• La persistance de l’autoritarisme ; 
• La transition par contrainte : la transition est 
initiée par les régimes et non par la société civile. 
Robert Dahl a élaboré le modèle de transition le plus 
abouti. Le processus de transition engage les Etats à 
une restructuration à trois dimensions de leur 
système : passer d’un gouvernement de parti unique 
à une démocratie pluraliste, de la planification 
centrale à l’économie de marché, et d’une forme 
d’autarcie à l’intégration dans l’économie mondiale. 
Cet ordre du jour se retrouvant dans toutes les 
maquettes de réforme, le concept formule donc le 
cadre général de la transition et les problèmes à 
résoudre. 
Mais cette transition obéit à des réflexes de survie 
plus qu’à des convictions profondes d’instaurer un 
processus démocratique sur des bases honnêtes. 
Disons qu’il s’agit d’une transition forcée et non 
pactisée2. Certes, le régime politique laisse à la société 
des pans entiers de ses anciennes prérogatives, mais 
sans renoncer pour autant à son pouvoir. Cette 
« stratégie de survie »3 démontre que « la 
libéralisation économique, sans impliquer une 
redistribution du pouvoir »4. Guy Hermet insiste sur 
la transition démocratique en précisant qu’elle 
recouvre trois opérations distinctes5 : 
• la mise en place d’institutions démocratiques ; 
• l’instauration d’un jeu démocratique fondé sur le 
respect du droit, un système de partis viables, le 
compromis ;  
• enfin le traitement des obstacles économiques de 
nature structurelle et conjoncturelle capable de 
faire échouer la démocratisation. 
L’Europe de l’Est : une expérience à méditer 
On s’est aussi beaucoup posé la question, ces 
derniers temps, de savoir si le printemps arabe avait 
des points communs avec la chute des régimes 
communistes d’Europe de l’Est en 1989. S’il y a une 
différence que l’on peut signaler, c’est justement le 
soutien des pays occidentaux aux pouvoirs tunisien 
Transitions dans le Monde arabe : la fin du paradigme sécuritaire? 
Par Hasni Abidi* 
* Hasni Abidi est directeur du Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Monde Arabe et Méditerranéen (CERMAM) à Genève.  
1 G. O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies (John 
Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
2 J.-N. Ferrié, J.-C. Santucci (dir.), Dispositifs de démocratisation et dispositifs autoritaires en Afrique du Nord, (CNRS, 2006), p. 12.  
3 Voir D. Brumberg, « Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World », in : R. Brynen, B. Korany, P. Noble (dir.), 
Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Theoretical Perspectives, vol. 1 (Lynne Rienner, 1995).  
4 J.-N. Ferrié, J.-C. Santucci, op. cit., p. 12.  
5 G. Hermet, « Les démocratisations au vingtième siècle : une comparaison Amérique Latine/Europe de l’Est », Revue Internationale de 
Politique Comparée, vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, p. 286.  
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et égyptien au détriment des sociétés. L’exact 
contraire, en somme, de ce qui s’était passé à 
l’époque, l’Occident ayant alors joué les sociétés 
contre les régimes, au motif de la lutte entre les 
deux blocs de la Guerre froide. La Tunisie, l’Egypte 
et la Libye se sont donc libérées de leurs autocrates 
par leurs propres moyens, et c’est tout à leur 
honneur. 
Une transition incertaine 
Le monde arabe est la seule région du monde qui 
soit restée loin des vagues de réforme démocratique 
auxquelles ont assisté depuis les années 1980 l’Asie et 
l’Amérique latine. Oui, nous vivons un tournant 
historique. Après la révolution tunisienne, le monde 
arabe ne sera plus comme avant. Les dirigeants se 
rendent compte que les populations sont capables 
d’exprimer des revendications et de les défendre 
jusqu’au bout. Mais les régimes en place n’y sont pas 
préparés. Ils n’ont pas de réponse immédiate. Une 
panique s’est emparée d’eux : leur seule réponse est 
sécuritaire et militaire. Nous sommes face à des 
pouvoirs qui ne savent que réprimer. 
Les pays arabes vivront une phase d’instabilité 
prolongée. Une période de transition se définit par 
l’incertitude et l’inquiétude. Le retour à 
l’autoritarisme n’est pas rare dans ce type de 
processus. L’échec est une hypothèse plausible si la 
transition ne s’accompagne pas de la création 
d’institutions légitimes. Comment répondre aux 
attentes d’une population impatiente, qui a souffert 
et qui souhaite prendre son destin en main ? 
L’accumulation des difficultés contribue à menacer le 
changement. D’un côté, il faudrait convaincre les 
populations que les réformes nécessaires ne peuvent 
être que lentes. De l’autre côté, les gouvernements de 
transition sont obligés d’innover pour répondre à la 
pression populaire. 
Dans les deux pays en transition – en Egypte et en 
Tunisie –, l’armée a nommé à des postes importants 
des personnalités de l’ancien régime. Certes, 
l’institution militaire veut rassurer. Elle veut une 
transition dans l’ordre, et assurer la pérennité de 
l’Etat. Mais cela exige des acteurs politiques et 
économiques expérimentés. Or la population ne le 
comprend pas, elle veut la rupture totale et 
immédiate. La question est de savoir comment 
rompre avec l’ancien régime tout en construisant un 
nouveau projet politique acceptable pour tous. 
L’avantage de la Tunisie sur l’Egypte est que, chez 
la première, l’armée bénéficie d’une bonne image 
auprès de la population. Dans les deux pays, c’est 
elle qui est intervenue pour éviter un bain de sang. 
Cependant les militaires ne sont pas formés à la 
démocratie. L’armée a besoin de temps pour 
apprendre à jouer ce nouveau rôle et établir un lien 
de confiance avec la population. 
L’argument avancé par les partisans de la 
construction européenne pour justifier l’absence 
d’une politique étrangère commune est le manque de 
moyens. Démunie d’une capacité militaire suffisante, 
l’Europe des 27 reste tributaire du parapluie 
américain en matière de défense. Tiraillements et 
égoïsmes nationaux empêchent l’émergence d’un 
consensus permettant la mise en œuvre d’une 
véritable diplomatie européenne. 
Revisiter le processus d’Helsinki 
Le vent du changement politique qui secoue 
aujourd’hui le monde arabe a coûté jusqu’à présent 
zéro centime au contribuable européen. Pourtant, 
depuis le fameux dialogue euro-arabe inauguré dans 
les années 1970 jusqu’au processus euro-
méditerranéen, en passant par la « politique de 
voisinage » et la triste Union pour la Méditerranée, 
Bruxelles avait dépensé des milliards d’euros pour 
essayer d’obtenir une « éventuelle tentative de 
réforme ». Seul résultat : la consolidation de 
l’autoritarisme et sa mise à jour pour se conformer 
aux exigences européennes. Le « printemps arabe » a 
bousculé les paradigmes en vigueur dans les capitales 
européennes, dirigeants et élites, qui avaient 
longtemps compté sur les régimes en place pour 
lancer des réformes, mais jamais sur les dynamiques 
internes. 
Il n’est pas trop tard pour l’Union européenne, qui a 
accompli une mission historique auprès des pays de 
l’ex-bloc communiste. Elle a permis la mise en marche 
du processus d’Helsinki, avec ses fameuses « trois 
corbeilles ». Une ingénierie politique qui, par son 
soutien à la société civile et aux dynamiques culturelles 
et sociales, a aidé les pays de l’Est à s’affranchir du 
joug soviétique. Malheureusement, le processus de 
Barcelone (Euromed), inspiré d’Helsinki par ses trois 
volets – politique, économique et culturel – n’a pas eu 
l’effet escompté. Il s’est heurté à l’inextricable conflit 
israélo-palestinien et à la tendance des gouvernements 
arabes à tirer prétexte de blocage du processus de paix 
entre Arabes et Israéliens pour traîner les pieds. Quant 
à l’Europe, elle n’a pas assez insisté sur son souhait de 
voir l’autre rive de la Méditerranée accéder à un 
minimum de démocratie. Elle s’est contentée 
d’octroyer un satisfecit à ses voisins du sud pour leur 
soutien dans la guerre contre le terrorisme et contre 
les flux migratoires et de saluer leurs efforts de 
libéralisation économique. Les droits de l’homme 
peuvent attendre. En accédant ainsi au statut 
d’interlocuteur des démocraties européennes, des 
régimes autoritaires se sont offert une nouvelle 
légitimité. 
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L’Europe : comment devenir garant de la 
transition 
L’Union Européenne qui fut aux avant-postes de la 
transition démocratique dans les pays d’Europe 
centrale et orientale a un rôle à jouer dans l’évolution 
des pays arabes. Engagée à leurs côtés dans le cadre de 
l’Union pour la Méditerranée, l’UE pourrait réfléchir à 
la création de dispositifs qui créeraient un cercle 
vertueux, liant les réformes démocratiques à des 
objectifs précis et suffisamment motivants pour les 
pays concernés, afin de créer une véritable 
conditionnalité politique dans le respect des 
souverainetés nationales. L’Europe a aussi tout intérêt à 
se tourner vers les sociétés civiles des pays arabes pour 
créer un riche réseau d’échanges et de soutien, 
précurseur d’une union des peuples de la Méditerranée. 
Un volontarisme diplomatique nouveau qui 
intervient après une longue période de sommeil, 
attribuable à trois principaux facteurs :  
1. l’Europe n’est capable ni de mesures incitatives, 
économiques ou politiques, ni de mesures de 
rétorsions crédibles contre des belligérants. 
2. les pays membres de l’Union européenne ont des 
préférences contradictoires et souvent, certains 
Etats ont des priorités incompatibles avec les 
objectifs immédiats du changement politique. 
3. les Américains s’efforcent d’écarter les Européens 
des dossiers qu’ils considèrent comme leur 
monopole. Bruxelles ne va pas insister auprès de 
Washington pour lui disputer un rôle au succès 
incertain. Pour l’Europe, il est temps de repenser 
son approche stratégique, de recentrer ses 
activités et de rechercher une coordination plus 
efficace (une répartition du travail plus claire) avec 
les États-Unis pour contribuer à une paix et une 
stabilité durables au Moyen-Orient.  
Conséquences pour l’UE 
1. Il est difficile pour l’Union européenne 
d’appréhender la nouveauté et les changements 
fréquents dans les pays arabes après des années de 
stabilité figée. Le monde arabe qui change 
représente donc un défi pour l’UE. 
2. Risque d’augmentation des flux migratoires non 
maîtrisées avec des conséquences néfastes sur les 
opinions publiques des pays membres de l’UE. 
3. L’Union européenne est appelée à réorienter sa 
politique, s’interroger sur la faisabilité de sa 
politique étrangère qui a été conçue pour une élite 
politique aujourd’hui discréditée et pour répondre 
à une situation révolue. 
 
 
Les atouts de l’Union européenne  
Le temps d’une mission nouvelle pour l’Union 
européenne dans le processus de transition est arrivé. 
Pourquoi ? 
Les divergences au sein des pays européens dans la 
gestion des relations avec les pays en transition est en 
mesure de donner des ailes à l’UE pour se profiler en 
tant qu’interlocuteur privilégié. L’échec des 
politiques précédentes des Européens est un 
argument pour donner à l’Union davantage de 
pouvoir. 
L’affaiblissement de certains régimes du Sud connus 
par leur résistance soutenue au changement politique 
et économique est un élément positif dans 
l’affirmation des orientations de Bruxelles. 
Les nouvelles instances de transition partagent les 
mêmes valeurs démocratiques que l’UE, ce qui 
faciliterait l’obtention d’un consensus européen pour 
engager un soutien politique et financier sans 
résistance de la part du Parlement européen.  
L’absence d’un agent reconnu neutre et impartial 
dans la gestion de la transition et la régulation des 
conflits laisserait la place à Bruxelles pour se profiler 
en tant que facilitateur entre tous les acteurs. La 
présence de milliers de cadres européens d’origine 
arabe est un atout non négligeable qui pourrait être 
utilisé comme vecteur complémentaire de médiation 
et de transition. 
Conclusion 
Ma conclusion reprend le constat des hommes 
d’affaire turcs. Ils sont anonymes à considérer que 
dans l’état actuel, le statut d’un pays candidat est plus 
avantageux que celui d’Etat membre. La candidature 
a permis aux Turcs d’enregistrer des avancées 
notables sur les plans juridiques, politiques et 
économiques. La perspective de l’adhésion stimule la 
Turquie à faire des efforts pour mériter sa place à 
Bruxelles. Le monde arabe n’est pas en retrait. 
L’Union européenne devrait réfléchir sur un cadre en 
mesure d’alimenter la marche vers la transition. Je 
plaide pour une réponse concrète qui récompense ou 
qui soutient les peuples par un « grand prix », entre 
l’adhésion et la candidature. 
Je reste persuadé que le processus de Barcelone était 
une réponse adéquate aux exigences du moment. Les 
régimes du Sud ont vu dans ce processus un mariage 
blanc, ou une offre européenne pour se re-légitimer. 
Ils l’ont accepté mais en le vidant de tout son sens. 
D’où l’échec programmé de Barcelone. 
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O ne year has just passed since the beginning of the end of authoritarian regimes on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean and in 
the wider Arab world. The sequence has been truly 
impressive: Tunisia first, then Egypt; Libya next; and 
now apparently Yemen, with Syria teetering on the 
brink. In parallel, Morocco has gone through 
significant constitutional and political change, albeit 
along a different pattern: namely, liberalisation “from 
above” rather than popular revolt or even civil war. But 
one thing is increasingly clear: the Arab peoples have 
eventually joined the global trend towards 
democratisation that has characterised the last quarter 
of the 20th century, from Southern Europe to South 
America, from South-East Asia and Africa to Central 
and Eastern Europe. In fact, until 2010, only the 
Algerian war of decolonisation in the late 1950s and the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 (but in a non-Arab country) 
had seen active and even massive popular participation 
in the region – and neither prompted democratisation. 
Otherwise, regime change had only occurred through 
national revolutions “from above”, mostly in the shape 
of quasi-military coups against old monarchs and 
rulers. 
Arab springs – and streets 
Europeans (and “Westerners” at large) have come to 
define this ongoing development in our Southern 
neighbourhood as “the Arab Spring”. The label refers, 
more or less explicitly, to the “Prague Spring” of 1968 
or, possibly, even to the printemps des peuples of 1848 
(certainly more comparable with respect to the 
“contagion” spreading from Paris to other European 
capitals). Surely neither precedent is particularly 
encouraging, as both were violently repressed, although 
the popular uprisings were eventually vindicated a few 
decades later. Still, the term “spring” (preferably in the 
plural form, considering also the various paths taken by 
the phenomenon since its inception) seems broadly 
capable of rendering the spirit of what the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung has called “Arabellion”, as “spring” 
conveys – along with a sense of rebirth after a long 
bleak season – also the idea of a natural source and a 
sudden leap. 
Another quite recurrent comparison in the European 
media in the first half of 2011 is that made with 1989 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall. While the starting 
conditions were quite different from those in the Arab 
world – in terms of both geopolitical background (the 
Soviet “empire’) and local civic traditions – two other 
common elements stand out: the “domino” effect, yet 
again, and the “strategic surprise” represented by the 
outbreak itself. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that in 1989 “regime 
change” became indeed ever faster from one country 
to another whereas, in 2011, it has become ever slower 
and arguably more violent1. Timothy Garton Ash’s 
famous joke with Vaclav Havel – whereby the 
transition “took in Poland ten years, in Hungary ten 
months, in the GDR ten weeks: maybe it will take just 
ten days in Czechoslovakia?”2 – can only be applied in 
reverse to the Arab springs: it took one month in 
Tunisia, then one in Egypt (but the process is not 
over), eight months in Libya, nine (so far) in Yemen, 
and Syria is still on fire. It is indeed as though 
authoritarian Arab rulers had learned from the alleged 
mistakes and weaknesses of their fallen peers and were 
increasingly concentrating their efforts to prevent or 
postpone their own end by all possible means. In 1989, 
the collapse of the system was a sort of work in 
progress, a gentle spiralling down through a mostly 
peaceful whirlwind – despite widespread concerns 
about possible bloodsheds. 
As for the “strategic surprise” hitting the West (again) – 
whether in Europe’s East 1989 or in Africa’s North 
2010 (not to mention America’s 9/11/2001) – it has 
been just another case of failure to connect the dots. 
The Arab springs were broadly predictable, or at least 
imaginable. The basic information was already there, 
and so were the symptoms: a cluster of autocratic 
political structures in which ageing (and often ailing) 
leaders presided over massively corrupt and repressive 
regimes, coupled with stagnating economies and an 
overwhelmingly young, relatively well-educated but also 
dramatically under-employed population. 
Some triggering factors may have been contingent and 
country-specific (a spike in food prices, one tax too 
Arab Springs: Transition, Democratisation and Civil Society – Lost and Found 
By Antonio Missiroli* 
* Dr. Antonio Missiroli is an Adviser in the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA). 
1 Tunis’ “Jasmine Revolution” – a definition, once again, reminiscent of such European precedents as Georgia (the Rose Revolu-
tion, late 2003) and Ukraine (the Orange Revolution, late 2004) – suffered approximately 100 victims, out of 10 million citizens. The 
Egyptian “spring” in early 2011 registered roughly 800 casualties, out of a population of 80 million (but things may not be over yet). 
In Libya the victims were in the region of 50 000 (out of 6 million), while in Syria (with a population of more than 20 million) the 
casualties by December 2011 are estimated to lie somewhere between 5000 and 10000 – and counting.  
2 And it did: see his own account in The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Random 
House, 1990). 
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many, or just another episode of ethnic discrimination) 
but the underlying causes were well discernible all 
across the region. What in part made it difficult to 
connect such dots was also the degree of collusion or 
tolerance by Western governments with the 
authoritarian rulers – in the name of stability, 
predictability and order. True, this varied significantly 
among countries and according to proximity, exposure 
and dependency. Yet acceptance of the status quo was 
quite widespread, in Europe and the wider West. This 
is also why the response – far more than in 19893 – has 
been awkward, fragmented, and slow. 
It used to be customary for Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) experts4 to wonder what “the Arab 
street” thought and talked about; in most cases such 
“street” was perceived as a sort of whispering crowd 
whose moods and opinions constituted a side show to 
the main drama on stage. Now, however, they are 
being offered a clearer idea of what the Arab streets 
(and squares!) may think and expect. Although, what 
the Arab peoples might actually get in the end is much 
less clear at this stage. 
From springs to transitions 
The academic literature on democratisation – the 
transition process that the “springs” have triggered – 
has grown over the years and come in waves, mostly 
following successive cycles of political change: 
Portugal, Greece and Spain in the mid-1970s, South 
America’s Cono Sur in the 1980s, Central Europe since 
1989, the post-Soviet “space” in the 1990s, but also 
various spots in Asia (from the first “tigers” to 
Indonesia) and Africa5. Comparative political scientists 
have constantly emphasised some key distinctions, 
namely: 
• between liberalisation and democratisation, in that 
the latter entails the former but is a wider and more 
specifically political concept; this implies, of course, 
that there can be liberalisation without 
democratisation (as was the case with Gorbachev’s 
“glasnost” and “perestroika’); 
• between transition to (electoral) democracy and 
consolidation of democracy; this implies that not all 
countries that undertake a transition end up with a 
fully democratic system. In this case, they get 
“hybrid” (static) or “transitional” (dynamic) regimes 
in which different elements coexist and compete. 
Several post-Soviet states are typical examples of 
“hybrid” regimes, but so are also some African and 
Asian countries6. Other analysts have defined these 
cases – which encompass a wide set of different 
transitions – as “partial” or even “illiberal” 
democracies7. What is common to them is that, once 
the democratic transition is under way, it becomes very 
difficult (but not impossible) to return to full 
authoritarianism: this would indeed require much 
greater coercive resources than previously. 
In light of this significant body of research, is it 
possible to define what characterises a consolidated 
democracy? Some time ago Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (1996) proposed a standard definition that still 
appears broadly convincing, especially since it leaves 
ample room for several variations: 
“A democratic transition is complete when 
sufficient agreement has been reached about 
political procedures to produce an elected 
government; when a government comes to power 
that is the direct result of a free and popular vote; 
when this government de facto has the authority 
to generate new policies; and when the executive, 
legislative and judicial power generated by the 
new democracy does not have to share power with 
other bodies de jure”8. 
More specifically, they argued that the existence of a 
functioning state is a crucial precondition for a 
3 It was, once again, Timothy Garton Ash who underlined the high degree of acceptance of the division of Europe (and of Germany 
in particular) before the collapse of communism: In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (Random House, 1993). But then 
the West’s reaction was definitely quicker, thanks to both the US lead and the Helsinki process.  
4 MENA is indeed the acronym normally adopted in EU parlance to cover both the region as such and the non-EU countries invol-
ved since 1995 in the so-called Barcelona Process (or EuroMed). It is, however, far from being the only one in use: while the exact 
dividing line between Maghreb and Mashrek remains controversial, the French-speaking world often resorts to the term “Asie occi-
dentale” to define the latter – which the Americans, in turn, call Greater Middle East. This said, the common historical and cultural 
“space” is still the “Mediterranean” at large, although so far nobody – from Fernand Braudel to Predrag Matvejevic – has been able 
to capture its precise contours. For an impressive historical overview and unparalleled insight see D. Abulafia, The Great Sea: A Hu-
man History of the Mediterranean (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
5 See for instance G. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, A. Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986); G. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (University of California Press, 
1990); and A. Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
6 E. Baracani (ed.), Democratization and Hybrid Regimes: International Anchoring and Domestic Dynamics in European post-Soviet States 
(European Press Academic Publishing, 2010).  
7 See e.g. F. Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, no. 6 (November/December 1997), vol.76, as well as his The 
Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Norton, 2003). 
8 J.J. Linz, A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996).   
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democratic polity. Beyond that, five other 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions 
must also exist (or be crafted) for a democracy to be 
consolidated: 
• the development of a free and lively civil society; 
• a relatively autonomous political society (parties and 
organised groups); 
• rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ 
freedoms and independent associational life; 
• a state bureaucracy usable by the new democratic 
government; 
• an institutionalised economic society. 
When all these conditions are met, democracy becomes 
“the only game in town” (Di Palma). 
Since then, a number of additional sub-indicators and 
benchmarks have been invented and inserted in order 
to cover and compare the democratic performance of 
states across the world. All sorts of data have been 
gathered and indexes drawn up to measure 
democratisation, either by international organisations 
(World Bank, OECD, UN) or by foundations, media 
and NGOs: IDEA, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Freedom House 
in particular. 
For their part, the West in general and the EU in 
particular have since been confronted with an 
additional set of transitions and democratisations. The 
Western Balkans, in fact, have gone through a triple 
transition since the death of Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman (1999) and the fall of Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic (2000): one from war to peace 
(including foreign intervention); one from a command 
to a liberal market economy; and one from a single-
party rule to a pluralist democracy – all this in a context 
of unresolved and contested statehood issues. 
The initially transatlantic and then increasingly 
European effort at stabilising and integrating the new 
Balkan states has thus contributed to further refining 
the understanding of democratic transition and 
consolidation, e.g. with the distinction between formal 
(procedural) and effective (substantive) democracy9. 
On top of that, the fact that the Balkan countries were 
all accepted as potential candidates to join both NATO 
and the EU has made it possible to intervene more 
directly – not unlike but less than in Central Europe – 
in shaping their systems: through robust conditionality, 
mainly, but occasionally also through quasi-
protectorates (Bosnia, Kosovo). 
The Balkan comparison, however, does not really fit 
with the Arab “springs”. Democratisation in South-
eastern Europe was not triggered by any “spring” but 
rather by civil war and ethnic strife, plus foreign 
intervention. Furthermore, not only is the prospect of 
integration through accession not applicable in the 
Southern Mediterranean (thus weakening 
conditionality), but one of the key peculiarities of the 
Balkans – the influence of organised crime within both 
society and the state – is less relevant in the Southern 
EU neighbourhood. 
On the other hand, nobody has factored in – at least 
not yet – the peculiarities of the Arab world itself, now 
that it seems to have started down this road too. In 
particular, what is normally called “political Islam” – 
namely the influence of religion in shaping politics and 
legislation – may in fact become a critical distinctive 
factor of this last “wave” of democratisation, and a 
passage that can make or break the Arab transitions10.  
This will unquestionably require a lot of careful 
handling by Europe and the West. For, much as the 
final destination matters enormously, the journey itself 
is no less important. 
“Deep” democracy and civil society 
The Joint Communication by the European 
Commission and the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, released on 25 May 
2011 and titled “A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood”, represents the most comprehensive 
common European approach to date to the new 
challenges posed by the Arab “springs” and to other 
developments in the Union’s neighbours – “whether 
they are experiencing fast regime change or a 
prolonged process of reform and democratic 
consolidation” – as well as a much needed review of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
The Communication does indeed embrace the main 
findings of the academic literature on democratisation 
in that it defines “democracy” as a set of standards ad 
benchmarks (but also as a value, alongside human 
rights and the rule of law). In particular, it articulates 
the new notion of “deep and sustainable democracy” 
as incorporating a number of distinct elements. These 
are: 
• free and fair elections; 
• freedom of association, expression and assembly, 
and a free press and media; 
• the rule of law administered by an independent 
judiciary, and right to a fair trial; 
9 For a thorough analysis of the Balkans in the democratisation context, see R. Balfour, C. Stratulat, The Democratic Transformation of 
the Balkans, Issue Paper no. 66 (EPC, November 2011): www.epc.eu.  
10 Even in the case of Turkey, the first and arguably only “consolidated’ democracy in the Muslim world (with possibly Indonesia 
trailing now), it was notably the emergence of a strong Islamist party that triggered the last direct intervention of the military in the 
political arena in 1997.  
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• the fight against corruption; 
• security and law enforcement sector reform 
(including the police) and the establishment of 
democratic control over armed and security forces. 
This last element clearly stems also from EU recent 
experience with the enlargement process as well as with 
its civilian crisis management operations in places as 
diverse as the Balkans, the Middle East and Congo11 – 
and it highlights an additional potential supporting role 
for the Union in those Southern Mediterranean 
countries who may be willing to call on it for assistance 
and advice. 
Interestingly, the Joint Communication makes an 
implicit distinction between “pursuing 
democratisation” in the context of the Eastern 
Partnership (which includes Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and 
“building democracies and extensive reforms” in the 
Southern Mediterranean. Similar nuances were 
detectable also in the previous approach adopted by 
the EU in the ENP framework: by comparing the 
various ENP Action Plans, in fact, not only did the top 
four priorities for, respectively, the Eastern and the 
Mediterranean neighbours differ significantly, but the 
former were clearly expected to “develop” democracy, 
the latter to “encourage” it12. 
All this seems to indicate implicit awareness of the 
different stages in the democratisation process EU 
neighbours find themselves in – as well as, arguably, 
the specificities of Southern Mediterranean and Arab 
countries, to which the Union had proposed, in a 
previous Communication (8 March 2011), “A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”. 
Last but certainly not least, the ENP Communication 
backed the idea of setting up a European Endowment 
for Democracy (EED) with a view to supporting 
“political actors striving for democratic change in their 
countries (especially political parties and non-registered 
NGOs or trade unions and other social partners)” and 
bringing “greater influence and consistency to the 
efforts of the EU, its Member States and several of the 
large European political foundations that are already 
active in this field”. 
Clearly inspired by the US National Endowment for 
Democracy, the EED idea was endorsed by the Polish 
EU Presidency – albeit with special emphasis on the 
Eastern neighbourhood13 – and translated into 
preparatory work for its statute and eventual launch, 
culminating in a Declaration released by the Foreign 
Affairs Council on 19 December 2011. Still, the EED’s 
scope will not be limited, in principle, to the Union’s 
neighbourhoods, and the Endowment will operate 
autonomously, although with the stated goal of 
reinforcing “synergies and coherence” with “other 
democratisation tools” already adopted and 
implemented by the Union – starting with the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), and 
the newly created Civil Society Facility and the Support 
for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth 
programme, aptly branded SPRING. 
Lost in transition? 
All these tools will soon be confronted with what 
already looks to be a major policy challenge for Europe 
and the wider West: the emergence, in the various 
transitions currently under way in the MENA region, 
of strong Islamic parties who are all set to join 
government. Regardless of the modalities of the 
respective transition, sequencing and depth of 
constitutional and electoral reform14, in fact, forces of 
explicit (if relatively moderate) Islamic persuasion have 
collected a plurality – around 40 % – of the votes cast 
in Tunisia (23 October), Morocco (25 November), and 
Egypt (28 November). 
However different the Nahda party, the Justice and 
Development party, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice party may be, they are likely to 
represent the first winners of democratisation in the 
region and the indispensable interlocutors – probably 
as senior partners in power-sharing agreements with 
smaller secular parties – for any common EU 
endeavour to “build” democracy in the Southern 
Mediterranean.  
Furthermore, around the same time, Libya’s interim 
leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil pledged publicly to uphold 
Sharia law and make it the basic source of the new 
Constitution and legal code, raising a number of 
eyebrows among European diplomats. 
This may well become a crucial test for the EU’s new 
approach. The first such precedent – Hamas’ electoral 
11 See G. Grevi, D. Helly, D. Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), EUISS (Paris, 2009): 
www.iss.europa.eu.  
12 A. Missiroli, , The ENP in Future Perspective, in R.G. Whitman, S. Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective 
(Palgrave, 2010). 
13 See for instance R. Sikorski, “Fostering Europe’s Infant Democracies”, Europe’s World, no. 19, Autumn 2011. 
14 For an insightful analysis of the different provisions adopted since the springs' outbreak, see M. Meyer-Resende, “Rules for Tran-
sition”, New York Times, 25 November 2011, and Promoting Consensus: Constitution-Making in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Briefing Paper no.19, 
by Democracy Reporting International, a Berlin-based NGO promoting political participation: www.democracy-reporting.org. See 
also K. Kausch, Constitutional Reform in Young Arab Democracies, Policy Brief no. 101, October 2011, FRIDE: www.fride.org.  
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victory in the Palestinian territories in early 2006 – was 
not particularly well managed by the West, even 
considering the different strategic context of the time.  
In addition, Islamic groups are likely to advocate and 
possibly implement legislation that, in principle, would 
go against both European values and universal human 
rights: allowance of polygamy, for instance, lesser status 
for women or banning of homosexuality, and especially 
possible limitations to religious freedom.  
In fairness, this time around Western reactions have 
been (to date) quite moderate, although some emerging 
Islamist groups in the region are not. Still, in less than 
one year, the shift away from the initially “modern” 
and secular mood of the Arab springs (with all their 
Facebookers and Twitterers) has been indeed quite 
impressive. At least in some countries, this may entail a 
step backwards in terms of civil society development 
and affect another key element of all transitions, 
namely national, societal, and possibly even regional 
reconciliation. 
While some analysts in the West have started talking of 
an “Arab winter”, liberal activists in the region seem to 
believe that this is just a phase, that the springs were 
not carried out in the name of Islam, and that the 
pendulum will swing back. They also emphasise that, 
with the Arab springs, a new chapter in the history of 
the Arab world is being written, after the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, the failure of modernising (but 
authoritarian) nationalist regimes, and the rise and fall 
of Islamic radicalism as embodied by the Taliban and 
Al Qaida – a chapter that may bring to completion the 
decolonisation process initiated in the second half of 
the 20th century15. 
This peculiarity of the ongoing transitions in the Arab 
world has nothing to do with “Huntingtonian” views 
of a clash of civilisations: Arab (and more generally 
Islamic) societies per se are neither fully identical to nor 
inherently, irreconcilably different from other ones. 
Normative approaches are unhelpful here. What seem 
to matter is the degree of economic and social 
modernisation that took place before the springs – not 
just in specific urban areas but nation-wide – as well as 
the degree of modernisation that may be further 
achieved by and through the current transitions. The 
crucial variable, in other words, is not necessarily religion 
but rather tradition – and how this shapes political 
attitudes and expectations. 
Finding a new balance 
The recent shift in favour of Islamic parties and the 
resulting tension between tradition and transition 
confront the West with both old and new policy 
dilemmas. In the field of democratisation as well as in 
others, in fact, the EU in particular will have to strike a 
new, convincing and coherent balance: 
• Between conflicting priorities, as some Arab 
countries in the wider region are still run by 
authoritarian rulers but remain strategically 
important16; 
• between its political and its commercial interests, as 
European trade concessions may be key to 
supporting Southern Mediterranean economies that 
trade very little among themselves; 
• between its conflicting attitudes vis-à-vis migrants 
and the need to avoid a “brain drain” from the 
region; 
• between its broad support for democratic 
transitions and its possible temptation to pick (or 
reject) winners; 
• and between its broad ambitions (and others’ 
expectations) to strengthen civil society and the 
need to concentrate limited resources where it can 
make a real difference17. 
Europe has never been – and is even less so now – the 
only international player in the Mediterranean. But, 
whereas the interests of other players (including the 
US) can afford to be more selective, the EU is much 
more exposed to the risks of protracted instability in 
the region. To get its policies right, therefore, Europe 
will probably have to redefine its understanding of 
stability, bearing in mind that the authoritarian regimes 
slowly being brought down were not so much stable as 
stagnant18, not so much secular as cynical and corrupt. 
And that a thriving civil society in a well-functioning 
state is a recipe for peaceful and mutually beneficial 
neighbourly relations. 
15 The arguably most influential analyses in this domain are those by Bernard Lewis, from What Went Wrong? (2002) and The Crisis of 
Islam (2003) to The End of Modern History in the Middle East (2011). The insightful views of the Oxford historian transplanted to Prin-
ceton became controversial when the expression “clash of civilisations” – which he first coined to explain “the roots of Muslim 
rage” (The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990) – was picked up by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in his famous 
article “The Clash of Civilisations?” (Foreign Affairs, 72, no.3, Summer 1993) and subsequent book (1996).  
16 See M. Ottaway, M. Muasher, Arab Monarchies: Chances for Reform, Yet Unmet, The Carnegie Papers, December 2011: http://
carnegieendowment.org; and G. Paris, “Pourquoi les monarchies arabes ont mieux résisté à la contestation”, Le Monde, numéro spe-
cial Géo & Politique, 24-25 décembre 2011, p. 14.  
17 Tunisia is certainly a case in point, considering its size, its starting conditions, and its explicit willingness to work with the EU. For 
other reasons, also Morocco could be turned into a potential “success story’ for the EU (while Moldova could represent an impor-
tant test case in the Eastern neighbourhood). See i.a. S. Dennison, A. Dworkin, Europe and the Arab Revolutions: A New Vision for De-
mocracy and Human Rights, Policy Brief (ECFR, November 2011), www.ecfr.eu; and C.-P. Hanelt, E. Dietl, Europe and the Arabellion in 
2012, Spotlight Europe, 2011/05, December: www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/spotlight. 
18 V. Perthes, “Europe and the Arab Spring”, Survival, no. 6 (December 2011/January 2012), vol. 53. 
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